Hierarchical Event-Control and Subjective Experience of Agency by Devpriya Kumar & Narayanan Srinivasan
a particular level in the hierarchy. The level 
at which “self” gets attached could change 
as an organism continues to interact with 
the environment in the context of an inten-
tional goal, moving across different levels in 
the hierarchy at different times.
Empirical data from studies exploring 
the link between sense of self and event-con-
trol (Jordan, 2003; Kumar and Srinivasan, 
under review) suggest that participant’s 
sense of self does vary with the amount 
of control that they can exercise. We have 
studied the emergence of self as a function 
of different levels in a event-control hierar-
chy using a multi-agent paradigm (Kumar 
and Srinivasan, under review). When con-
trol is manipulated at multiple levels, self 
gets attached to the higher/more distal level 
at which control can be successfully exer-
cised. When the exercise of control is poor 
at a higher level, the sense of self attaches 
to the lower (more proximal) level of event-
control. The results also show that when 
people misidentify as some other agent 
pursuing a common goal, misidentifica-
tion is more when the other agent affords 
a greater experienced control (again in a 
hierarchical fashion). The results based on 
event-control approach is consistent with 
the studies that have shown a link between 
the feeling of control and the subjective 
experience of agency (Frith, 2005; Moore 
et al., 2009; Dewey et al., 2010; Desantis 
et al., 2011).
The event-control approach goes beyond 
other hierarchical predictive coding mod-
els of subjective experience (Frith, 2005; 
Seth et al., 2012), not conceptualizing self 
in terms of what is happening at the pre-
fixed top-level module in the hierarchy. It 
visualizes a dynamic fluid self that depends 
on control exercised at a particular level 
and changes as a function of an organism’s 
interactions with the environment. This 
enables us to understand changes in self 
A commentary on
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated 
agents, and the future of cognitive science
by Clark, A. (in press). Behav. Brain Sci.
Clark (in press) has argued that our brain 
uses hierarchical predictive coding and 
the use of this concept would enable us to 
understand the mental life of the organism. 
We agree that hierarchical predictive coding 
provides a good framework for developing 
further theories and models for different 
aspects of brain functioning including, per-
ception, action, attention, and experience.
An important but least understood 
aspect of human cognition is the “I” as an 
experiencer. A person perceives one’s self as 
an agent or controller of actions through 
one’s interactions with the environment. 
This influences the perception of the event 
itself. Events that are felt to be caused by 
self are perceived differently from other 
events. For example, subjective experience 
of flash lag effect reduces when the subject 
plays an active part in the event (Ichikawa 
and Masakura, 2010). Intentional bind-
ing between an action and a tone has been 
reported to become stronger when subjects 
experience greater control over the action 
(Moore et al., 2009).
Clark has pointed out that models of pre-
dictive coding may shed some light on aspects 
of subjective experience of agency (possibly 
self) and enable us to computationally model 
these experiences. A prediction based model 
that deals with self is the Bayesian version of 
the comparator model (Fletcher and Frith, 
2009). In this model, agency is based on 
the successful prediction of the organisms’ 
sensory consequences of action performed 
by the organism. This model has also been 
used as a major component in the predictive 
coding based model of conscious presence 
(Seth et al., 2012). While Clark in his paper 
has emphasized on the formation of subjec-
tive experiences, it is not immediately clear 
how self can be understood in the context of 
hierarchical predictive coding.
One possible way to understand self 
and agency is through the notion of event-
control (Jordan, 2003) which argues that 
self gets attached to a particular level of 
event-control at a given time. Using the 
example of driving, for an inexperienced 
driver, self would get attached to the proxi-
mal level of control related to hand or leg 
movements and the clutch, brake, and gear. 
However, an experienced driver for whom 
driving is fairly automatic self would get 
attached to the successful achievement of 
the goal, that is, driving from one place 
to another.
Event-control approach proposes the 
notion of hierarchically arranged control 
loops (Jordan, 2003) that are possibly 
nested (Feinberg, 2011), with the distal 
goal at the top-level and the proximal sen-
sory-motor loop at the lowest level. There 
is both a feed-forward and a feed-back 
information transfer between different lev-
els in the hierarchy. Each level constrains 
the activity of the lower levels by fixing 
certain parameters (the lower level con-
trol loops function under the constraints 
provided by the higher control loop). In 
return what is fed back to the higher level 
is the amount of control that the lower 
level could achieve given the constraints. 
Using this information, the constraints are 
modified so as to achieve efficient control 
by the lower levels.
In this approach, the subjective sense 
of self is not attached to a particular loop 
(Frith, 2005; Seth et al., 2012). It rather var-
ies dynamically as a function of the success-
ful control achieved at a particular level. The 
sense of self is conceptualized as fluid or 
plastic with self attached to the highest level 
in which control is successfully exercised at 
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and identity as a function of interaction 
between organism and the environment 
(as more situated and embodied) rather 
than simply focusing on the organism per 
se. In addition, self is neither visualized as 
a cause of decisions made by the organism 
nor as epiphenomenal but rather in terms of 
experience that emerges out of regularities 
in perception-action events.
To conclude, we broadly agree with the 
notion of hierarchical predictive coding and 
extend it to explain the emergence of self 
and the experience of agency by natural-
izing them as the level of control achieved 
at a given level in the hierarchy involving 
perceptual-action events. The use of hier-
archical control systems would enable us to 
study our mental life and better understand 
the epistemic concepts of intentionality, 
consciousness, and self.
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